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UP THE CHUTE, DOWN THE LADDER:  
SHIFTING PRIORITIES THROUGH 
STRUCTURED DISMISSALS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Bethany K. Smith* 
 
In a structured dismissal of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy 
court approves case dismissal alongside a stakeholder agreement as to the 
manner in which the estate is to be dealt with once the case has been 
dismissed.  Such orders are controversial in that they are not explicitly 
authorized through the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) and are 
especially controversial where the accompanying agreement seeks to 
distribute estate property in contravention of the priority scheme laid out in 
§ 507 of the Code.  Where the agreement violates this so-called waterfall 
payment method, bankruptcy courts are faced with difficult questions:  
Should structured dismissals be strictly governed by the Code’s priority 
regime?  Should they ever be approved where they deviate from priorities?  
If so, what standard should a bankruptcy court apply in deciding whether 
deviation is proper? 
This Note explores a recent decision by the Third Circuit, In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., where the court affirmed a bankruptcy court’s approval of a 
structured dismissal that cut against priorities, relying heavily on principles 
of economic efficiency and stakeholder compromise in reaching its holding.  
This Note argues that, while priority deviation is sometimes proper, the 
standard applied by the Third Circuit for approval of priority-noncompliant 
structured dismissals does not go far enough to ensure that the procedural 
safeguards of Chapter 11 are upheld.  This Note therefore proposes a 
multifactor analysis that would provide a more transparent system for 
approval of structured dismissals that do not comply with priorities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A structured dismissal is likely the most controversial Chapter 11 
bankruptcy exit strategy.1  A recent Third Circuit decision, In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.2 (Jevic), appears to have propelled that controversy further 
still.  Last year, the Third Circuit held that a settlement and structured 
dismissal of a Chapter 11 case might, in rare circumstances, deviate from 
the priority regime laid out in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”), 
meaning assets may be distributed to creditors of lower priority before more 
senior creditors are paid in full.3  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
extended a ruling on preplan settlements by the Second Circuit and rejected 
a contrary Fifth Circuit ruling.4 
The result has been a medley of both praise and criticism:  praise for the 
development of a more flexible mechanism by which debtors and creditors 
can work together to restructure or at least minimize economic harm,5 and 
criticism for the court’s failure to observe the important procedural 
 
 1. See infra Parts I.C., III.B. 
 2. 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 3. Id. at 182–84. 
 4. See infra Part II.B–D. 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
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safeguards of Chapter 11 reorganization.6  This Note suggests that, while 
priority deviation should be permitted under certain circumstances, the 
standard laid out by the Third Circuit for approval of priority-noncompliant 
structured dismissals is a far cry from what is required to ensure 
evenhanded treatment of stakeholders.7 
Part I of this Note gives an overview of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, along 
with its procedural steppingstones and its payment priority regime.8  It then 
describes the growing use of structured dismissals in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
and explicates the approval process for bankruptcy settlements.9  Part II 
discusses the recent Third Circuit decision in which priority deviation was 
allowed in a structured dismissal context, explaining briefly the Second and 
Fifth Circuit decisions referenced in the Third Circuit’s ruling.10  Part III 
then discusses whether the Third Circuit’s application of the Second 
Circuit’s standard to structured dismissals was proper, noting first the 
potential for economic benefit and the importance of stakeholder 
compromise, but then pointing out the need for creditor protection through 
Chapter 11 safeguards.11  Finally, Part IV proposes a multifactor analysis 
that would allow bankruptcy courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether approval of a priority-noncompliant structured dismissal would be 
appropriate in a given situation.12 
I.  THE CHAPTER 11 PROCESS:  
PLAN CONFIRMATION, SETTLEMENT APPROVAL, 
AND OTHER REORGANIZATION MECHANISMS 
This part first provides a brief overview of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
initially explaining the basic steps that a Chapter 11 debtor is expected to 
take throughout the course of his or her bankruptcy case13 and then 
addressing the importance of the Code’s priority regime for payment of 
unsecured creditors.14  It next addresses the use of structured dismissals in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, including the typical circumstances in which they 
arise, the reasons they may be favored, and why they are often criticized.15  
Finally, since structured dismissals are deemed to be bankruptcy 
settlements,16 this part of the Note also discusses the procedures bankruptcy 
courts must follow before approving such compromises among parties.17  
Part I.A first lays out the Chapter 11 process, explaining in particular the 
 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 9. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. See infra Part I.B. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. The question of whether a structured dismissal agreement in fact amounts to a 
settlement is not disputed in this Note, but one could argue that the settlement approval 
process should not govern them at all. 
 17. See infra Part I.D. 
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stringent requirements that Chapter 11 debtors must fulfill to rehabilitate 
their businesses successfully.18 
A.  A Brief Overview of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Although individuals can file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection,19 
Chapter 11 of the Code is most commonly used for the reorganization of 
businesses, allowing business debtors to continue to operate as going 
concerns and thus emerge from bankruptcy viable entities.20  Once a debtor 
files a Chapter 11 petition, an automatic stay prohibits debt collection 
efforts by the debtor’s various creditors.21  With this added layer of 
protection, debtors have an opportunity to construct a proposed plan of 
reorganization, which, if successful, will be confirmed by the bankruptcy 
court and then implemented according to its terms.22  Section 1129 of the 
Code lays out a number of requirements that must be met before a 
bankruptcy court can confirm a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.23  
Specifically, § 1129(a) governs confirmation requirements for consensual 
plans,24 and § 1129(b) governs confirmation requirements for 
nonconsensual plans.25 
In the context of consensual plan confirmation, § 1129(a)(9) dictates the 
terms on which stakeholder claims are to be paid, referring to the various 
kinds of claims specified in § 507 of the Code, which lays out the priority 
scheme for payment of unsecured creditors.26  In the context of 
nonconsensual plan confirmation, § 1129(b)(2), which unpacks the “fair 
and equitable” standard that must be satisfied before a bankruptcy court can 
confirm a plan over and above the objections of an impaired class of 
 
 18. See infra Part I.A. 
 19. JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11:41, Westlaw (database 
updated Dec. 2015) (“Chapter 11 is available to individuals, as they are included in the 
definition of persons eligible for such relief.”). 
 20. CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND & W. HOMER DRAKE JR., CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATIONS § 12:1 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2015). 
 21. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
 22. See id. § 1129. 
 23. See id. 
 24. A consensual plan requires every class to agree by a supermajority, meaning more 
than one-half of the number of claims and two-thirds in value. See id. § 1126(c)–(d).  Among 
other factors, the court may only confirm a consensual plan if it complies with all other 
applicable provisions of Title 11; the plan proponent complies with such provisions; the plan 
was proposed in good faith; payments made in connection with the plan have been approved 
or are subject to the approval of the court as reasonable; each holder of an impaired claim or 
interest has accepted the plan or will receive no less than they would otherwise receive 
through Chapter 7 liquidation; and each class of claims or interests has either accepted the 
plan or is not impaired under the plan. See id. § 1129(a)(1)–(4), (7)–(8). 
 25. Where the requirements of § 1129(a)(8) are not satisfied, meaning a class of 
impaired claims or interests has not accepted the plan, but all other provisions of § 1129(a) 
are satisfied, the court can confirm the plan only under the rubric of an additional 
requirement:  that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with 
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the 
plan.” Id. § 1129(b)(1).  Section 1129(b) then goes on to unpack the requirements of the “fair 
and equitable” standard for both secured and unsecured creditors. See id. § 1129(b)(2). 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
2016] SHIFTING PRIORITIES IN BANKRUPTCY 2993 
creditors,27 lays out payment distribution terms for both secured and 
unsecured creditors.28 
Ultimately though, whether a plan is consensual or nonconsensual, the 
Code’s payment priority scheme must be respected if a debtor is to achieve 
plan confirmation.29  Thus, Part I.B discusses the “waterfall” payment 
method laid out in § 507 of the Code and discusses the “absolute priority 
rule,” which applies only in the context of nonconsensual plan 
confirmation, but operates to ensure that an objecting class of unsecured 
creditors is not compelled to accept a plan that would subvert the priorities 
set out in § 507.30 
B.  Me First:  The Bankruptcy Code’s Payment Priority Regime 
Although the Code does not impose upon Chapter 11 debtors an 
insolvency eligibility requirement,31 as a practical matter most debtors 
cannot pay their creditors in full.  As a result, § 507 of the Code sets forth a 
“waterfall” payment method, which “controls the allocation of the debtor’s 
scarce resources by establishing a hierarchy of payments to creditors.  
Creditors with a higher priority must be paid in full before creditors having 
a lower priority are paid anything.”32  For the most part, § 507 governs 
payment to unsecured—as opposed to secured creditors—because 
“[s]ecured creditors are entitled to the benefit of their security.”33 
For nonconsensual plans, an additional layer of creditor protection exists 
in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code, which sets out the “absolute priority 
rule.”34  The rule essentially provides: 
To be fair and equitable with respect to a class of unsecured claims, a 
Chapter 11 plan may provide, as an alternative to meeting the requirement 
that each unsecured creditor receive or retain equivalent property, that the 
holder of any junior claim or interest will not receive or retain any 
property under the plan on account of the junior claim or interest.35 
 
 27. See supra note 25. 
 28. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(B).  With respect to a class of unsecured claims, 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) importantly provides that “the holder of any claim or interest that is 
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such 
junior claim or interest any property.” Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also infra Part I.B. 
(discussing this “absolute priority rule”). 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 30. See infra Part I.B. 
 31. See, e.g., Howard Seife, Solvent Debtors May Be Unable to Enter Bankruptcy in 
Absence of “Financial Distress”, 122 BANKING L.J. 52, 52 (2005) (“Under federal 
bankruptcy law, a debtor need not be insolvent before filing for bankruptcy protection.”). 
 32. James H. Barnhill, The Conundrum of an Inadequately Protected Secured Creditor, 
97 COM. L.J. 367, 369 (1992). 
 33. Id. at 369–70 (noting that, subject to the possibility of a secured creditor obtaining a 
superpriority under § 507(b) as a result of inadequate protection, administrative claims are to 
be paid first). 
 34. See 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2978, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2016) (“A 
plan that fails to comply with the absolute priority rule may not be confirmed without the 
approval of creditors.”); supra note 28. 
 35. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2978, Westlaw. 
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A plan cannot be confirmed without compliance with the absolute priority 
rule unless all classes of creditors approve it.36  This requirement enforces 
§ 507 by ensuring that a nonconsenting class of creditors is not forced, 
through a plan, to accept less than full compensation while junior creditors 
receive a payout or retain some interest in the debtor’s property.37 
Inevitably, however, not all Chapter 11 cases result in a successful 
reorganization; a number of them, in fact, end with case dismissal.38  Part 
I.C lays out the Code’s process for dismissal of a debtor’s Chapter 11 case 
and discusses the growing tendency among bankruptcy courts to dismiss a 
case while also approving an accompanying agreement among stakeholders 
as to the administration of the debtor’s estate, an order referred to as a 
“structured dismissal.”39 
C.  Chapter 11 Case Dismissal and Its “Structured” Counterpart 
Where, for instance, the particular circumstances of the debtor’s case 
demonstrate an absence of reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,40 the 
bankruptcy court must either dismiss the Chapter 11 case or convert the 
case to Chapter 7 of the Code, which provides for liquidation of the 
bankruptcy estate.41  Chapter 11 dismissal ordinarily returns stakeholders to 
their prepetition state law rights and remedies.42  Dismissal can occur not 
only where plan confirmation has failed, but also in the context of § 363 of 
the Code.  In recent years, Chapter 11 debtors increasingly have used § 363 
to effectuate a sale of all or substantially all of their assets (a “363 sale”),43 
and in fact, debtors are more frequently opting out of traditional Chapter 11 
reorganizations in favor of 363 sales.44  After a 363 sale, Chapter 11 debtors 
usually would follow one of three routes:  confirmation of a liquidating 
 
 36. See supra notes 25, 28. 
 37. Gary L. Kaplan, Understanding the Rules of Bankruptcy Cramdown, LAW360 (Sept. 
4, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/468678/understanding-the-rules-of-
bankruptcy-cramdown [https://perma.cc/5HMY-2PTD]. 
 38. The Code does not guarantee a successful reorganization, but rather provides the 
Chapter 11 debtor with a “breathing spell” to facilitate the desired end. See STRICKLAND & 
DRAKE, supra note 20. 
 39. See infra Part I.C. 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
 41. Under § 1112(a) of the Code, a debtor has an absolute right to convert a Chapter 11 
case to a Chapter 7 case. See id. § 1112(a). 
 42. See Nan Roberts Eitel et al., Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside the 
Code’s Structure?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2011, at 20 (noting that structured dismissals, 
unlike traditional dismissals, do not reinstate state law creditor remedies). 
 43. See id. at 21.  Section 363 of the Code allows debtors to sell estate assets outside of 
the ordinary course of business. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (allowing a trustee or debtor in 
possession to sell estate property “free and clear” of third party interests, such as liens, 
claims, and other encumbrances).  Section 363(f) lists conditions for 363 sales, at least one 
of which must be met for such a sale to be authorized. See id. 
 44. This is because 363 sales “can be accomplished quickly and without complying with 
Chapter 11’s disclosure and voting requirements . . . [they] reduce considerably the costs of 
administering the debtor’s estate . . . [and] will preserve the firm’s going concern value.” 
Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 260 (2012). 
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Chapter 11 plan;45 a Chapter 7 conversion; or a typical dismissal of the kind 
discussed above.46 
In both contexts, but particularly with regard to 363 sales, “structured 
dismissals” are increasingly being viewed as an acceptable and even a 
beneficial means by which a debtor can exit Chapter 11.47  Unlike typical 
dismissals, structured dismissals do not reinstate the prepetition status quo, 
but rather are conditioned upon certain elements agreed to ahead of time by 
stakeholders and approved by the bankruptcy court.48  Through a structured 
dismissal, stakeholders may find themselves in a more advantageous 
position than they would have been in were the bankruptcy court to follow 
the archetypal case dismissal process,49 and, because of this potential 
benefit to stakeholders, a number of bankruptcy courts have authorized 
structured dismissals upon the request of Chapter 11 debtors.50 
This Chapter 11 exit strategy is not one that is provided for explicitly in 
the Code51 and has therefore become the source of much judicial and 
academic debate.  One of the central concerns is that structured dismissals 
strongly resemble sub rosa plans of reorganization because of the 
possibility that debtors could use them to circumvent Chapter 11 
requirements and protections.52  A sub rosa plan arises where a debtor 
enters into a transaction outside of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that 
 
 45. Although Chapter 11 is traditionally used for reorganization purposes, it also can be 
used to enable liquidation of the debtor’s assets.  Section 1123(b)(4) of the Code states that a 
plan may “provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate, and the 
distribution of the proceeds of such sale among the holders of claims or interests.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(b)(4). 
 46. See Eitel et al., supra note 42. 
 47. See ERIC E. SAGERMAN, PATRICK A. MURPHY & DAVID NEIER, CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN 
BANKRUPTCY § 16:11 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2015) (A structured 
dismissal “may be particularly attractive after a debtor sells the majority of its assets under a 
§ 363 sale . . . and the costs of implementing a liquidating plan would be prohibitive”). 
 48. See id. (“As an alternative to a simple dismissal order and restoration of the status 
quo, parties may seek to wind up a [C]hapter 11 case through a ‘structured’ dismissal in 
which the bankruptcy court’s dismissal order includes additional provisions such as court-
approved releases or protocols for the reconciliation and payment of certain claims.”). 
 49. See, e.g., In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]here was 
‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution to anyone but the secured creditors unless 
the settlement were approved because the traditional routes out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
were impracticable.”). 
 50. See, e.g., In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 426 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015) 
(finding that a dismissal under § 305(a) of the Code was appropriate only if the court 
dismissed the Chapter 11 case through a structured dismissal); In re Buffet Partners, L.P., 
No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) (“[T]his 
sort of structured dismissal is well within the parameters established by the Fifth Circuit and 
the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 51. See SAGERMAN, MURPHY & NEIER, supra note 47 (noting that structured dismissals 
are not expressly provided for in either § 1112 of the Code, the provision dictating the 
requirements for conversion and dismissal of Chapter 11 cases, or § 305 of the Code, which 
also provides for case dismissal, although less explicitly and with no right to appeal). 
 52. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Structured Dismissals:  Smooth Off-Ramp or 
Artful Dodge?, 35 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (2015) (citing In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261 
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2014), in which the court directly invoked the sub rosa plan doctrine in 
rejecting a structured dismissal that subordinated claims of an objecting creditor). 
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significantly affects the bankruptcy estate.53  This often, although not 
always, involves a situation in which a buyer and debtor are seeking 
bankruptcy court approval of a sale order that not only dictates the terms of 
the sale but also sets out the terms on which proceeds will be distributed.54  
Agreements such as this may exist where the buyer is also a creditor of the 
debtor and is unlikely to go through with the purchase unless his or her 
claim is dealt with in a particular way.  Further, a bankruptcy court may 
determine that a sale order amounts to a sub rosa plan where the transaction 
lays out the terms of the ensuing reorganization plan, or impedes the rights 
afforded to parties through the plan confirmation process, such as creditors’ 
voting rights.55  Although no Code provision outwardly prohibits or even 
mentions sub rosa plans, courts have long viewed them as improper.56  The 
policy reason underlying this view rests on the notion that “the debtor and 
the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of 
Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the 
terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.”57 
Setting aside whether structured dismissals should be characterized in the 
same manner as sub rosa plans,58 the dismissals nonetheless contain an 
agreement among stakeholders requiring bankruptcy court approval, and 
thus courts tend to afford them the same treatment as settlements arising in 
the course of a Chapter 11 case.59  Part I.D provides an overview of 
settlement approval in bankruptcy, with particular reference to the 
requirements of Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
(“the Rules”). 
D.  Rule 9019 and Settlement Approval in Bankruptcy 
There are a number of different types of settlements that can arise 
throughout the course of a Chapter 11 case, such as a standalone settlement 
of a prepetition cause of action60 or an agreement in the form of a 
 
 53. See Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization:  Side-Stepping Creditor 
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 37 (1999). 
 54. The parties usually seek approval for such orders before a plan of reorganization has 
been confirmed. 
 55. See 3 BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 28B:7, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2015). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff 
Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also Sloane, supra note 53. 
 58. This Note will discuss this issue later. See infra Part III.B. 
 59. See, e.g., In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
settlement approval requirements of Rule 9019). 
 60. A Chapter 11 debtor may have prepetition causes of action that, post-filing, belong 
to the bankruptcy estate.  This gives either the trustee or the debtor in possession the 
authority to pursue such prepetition actions on the estate’s behalf, many of which result in 
settlement.  Alternatively, there may be outstanding claims existing against the debtor, which 
can be brought, post-filing, against the Chapter 11 estate.  Again, a vast majority of these 
cases result in settlement. See 3A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 29:695, 
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016). 
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disclosure statement.61  Rule 9019 governs the procedural requirements for 
approval of these various kinds of settlements and compromises where the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate is implicated.62  Rule 9019(a) provides that “[o]n 
motion by the trustee and after notice and hearing, the court may approve a 
compromise or settlement.”63  The purpose behind this provision is “to 
prevent the making of concealed agreements which are unknown to the 
creditors and unevaluated by the court.”64  Given this broad purpose, the 
provision applies not only to settlements reached in the context of contested 
matters but also to settlements reached in the context of adversary 
proceedings.65 
Rule 9019, however, is silent on the precise standard bankruptcy courts 
should apply when deciding whether to approve a given settlement.66  The 
leading case on this issue is Protective Committee for Independent 
Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson67 (TMT Trailer Ferry), 
a landmark Supreme Court ruling in which the Court laid out a multifactor 
test for settlement approval.68  The factors are intended to ensure that all 
settlements are “fair and equitable” and are in the best interests of the 
Chapter 11 debtor’s estate.69  This “fair and equitable” standard for 
settlements generally is deemed to mean something different than the “fair 
and equitable” standard contained in the Code for nonconsensual plan 
confirmation.70  Courts have therefore debated whether the absolute priority 
 
 61. Unlike a settlement of a prepetition cause of action, this type of agreement takes 
place in the context of a plan of reorganization. See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11:59 (5th 
ed.), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015).  Creditors vote on the disclosure statement, and 
a confirmation hearing takes place in which the substantive requirements of § 1129 are 
assessed by the bankruptcy court. See id. 
 62. See 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 3D § 167:1, Westlaw (database 
updated Jan. 2016) [hereinafter NORTON]. 
 63. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.  Because Rule 9019’s language does not explicitly require 
bankruptcy court approval of settlements, courts are split as to whether the approval process 
is mandatory or discretionary. See, e.g., Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 
186 F.3d 346, 351 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that Rule 9019 does not, by itself, create a 
substantive requirement of bankruptcy court settlement approval). Contra In re Signet 
Indus., Inc., No. 96-2534, 1998 WL 639168, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998) (“[A] trustee (or 
debtor-in-possession) may not enter into a compromise agreement . . . without the approval 
of the bankruptcy court.”).  It is worth noting that the weight of authority leans in favor of a 
mandatory standard. See Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, The Sanctity of Settlements and the 
Significance of Court Approval:  Discerning Clarity from Bankruptcy Rule 9019, 78 OR. L. 
REV. 425, 437 (1999).  A more detailed analysis of the arguments on either side is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
 64. In re Masters, Inc., 141 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 149 B.R. 289 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 65. 8 NORTON, supra note 62, § 167:1. 
 66. See Mark G. Douglas, Application of the Absolute Priority Rule to Pre-Chapter 11 
Plan Settlements:  In Search of the Meaning of “Fair and Equitable”, 3 PRATT’S J. BANKR. 
L. 17, 25–26 (2007). 
 67. 390 U.S. 414 (1968). 
 68. Id. at 424 (“[T]he judge should form an educated estimate of the complexity, 
expense, and likely duration of . . . litigation, the possible difficulties of collecting on any 
judgment which might be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment 
of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.”). 
 69. See Douglas, supra note 66, at 26. 
 70. See id. at 27. 
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rule must be upheld in the preplan settlement context, with the Second and 
Fifth Circuits taking vastly different approaches.71 
II.  A “RARE INSTANCE”:  
THE THIRD CIRCUIT ALLOWS PRIORITY DEVIATION 
IN A STRUCTURED DISMISSAL CONTEXT 
This part of the Note describes the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic to 
allow priority deviation in a structured dismissal context and explores two 
cases the Jevic Court referenced to justify its decision.  Part II.A first lays 
out the facts of Jevic and briefly runs through the Third Circuit’s reasons 
for approving the structured dismissal in question.72  Part II.B then 
discusses the Second Circuit’s ruling in In re Iridium Operating LLC73 
(Iridium), upon which the Third Circuit relied, which allowed deviation 
from priorities in a preplan settlement.  Part II.C lays out the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)74 (Matter of 
AWECO), which was rejected by the Third Circuit; in that case, the court 
ruled against priority deviation, requiring strict application of § 507 in the 
preplan settlement at issue.  Finally, Part II.D describes the Third Circuit’s 
application of the Second Circuit’s flexible Iridium standard.75 
A.  The Third Circuit’s Jevic Decision 
Courts and academics have afforded a fair amount of attention to the 
question of whether bankruptcy courts must respect priorities in the preplan 
settlement context.76  Whether structured dismissals must comply with the 
Code’s priority regime, however, has been touched on only lightly, most 
likely because of structured dismissal’s recent recognition and use.  This 
part of the Note addresses a recent ruling by the Third Circuit, In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., which held that bankruptcy courts, in certain situations, may 
approve structured dismissals that deviate from the Code’s priorities.77  
After first laying out the facts of Jevic, this section then discusses two 
conflicting courts of appeals’ decisions referenced by the Jevic Court,78 one 
of which was ultimately relied upon in reaching the Jevic holding.79 
Recently, the Third Circuit confronted the question of whether a 
bankruptcy court can approve a structured dismissal that undercuts the 
Code’s priority scheme.  In Jevic, a struggling trucking company, Jevic 
Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic”), was purchased by Sun Capital Partners 
(“Sun”) through a leveraged buyout financed by CIT Group/Business Credit 
 
 71. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 72. See infra Part II.A. 
 73. 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 74. 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 75. See infra Part II.D. 
 76. See, e.g., Iridium, 478 F.3d at 455; AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298; Douglas, supra note 
66, at 17. 
 77. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 78. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 79. See infra Part II.D. 
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Inc. (“CIT”).80  Despite the infusion of cash from the leveraged buyout, 
Jevic continued to struggle and eventually ceased operations.  In 2008, 
Jevic filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Delaware.81  It owed around $53 million to its first priority 
senior secured creditors (Sun and CIT) and around $20 million to tax and 
general unsecured creditors.82  Two groups filed suit during the bankruptcy 
case:  a group of recently terminated truck drivers (“the Drivers”), alleging 
violations of state and federal labor laws mandating sixty days written 
notice before layoffs,83 and the official committee of unsecured creditors 
(“the Committee”), alleging fraudulent conveyance and preferential transfer 
claims against Sun and CIT.84 
In 2012, the key players—the Committee, Jevic, CIT, Sun, and the 
Drivers—began negotiating a settlement to resolve the Committee’s 
fraudulent conveyance suit.85  At that point, the Jevic estate had only $1.7 
million in cash (which was subject to a lien belonging to Sun) and the claim 
against Sun and CIT; its remaining assets had been liquidated to repay the 
CIT lender group.86  Ultimately, the Committee, Jevic, CIT, and Sun 
reached an agreement setting out four conditions87:  first, they agreed to 
release their claims against one another and agreed that the fraudulent 
conveyance action would be dismissed with prejudice; second, CIT agreed 
to pay $2 million to cover Jevic and the Committee’s legal fees and 
administrative expenses; third, Sun agreed to assign its lien on the $1.7 
million to a trust to pay tax and administrative creditors and then general 
unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis; and finally, the parties agreed that 
Jevic’s Chapter 11 case would be dismissed.88 
With these various agreements in play, the parties contemplated a 
structured dismissal.  There was one major problem, though—the Drivers 
were left uncompensated, despite having an uncontested federal law claim 
against Jevic on account of the insufficient notice Jevic gave before their 
termination (a WARN Act claim).89  Thus, the Drivers and the U.S. Trustee 
filed objections to the proposed agreement, in part on the ground that it 
violated the Code’s priority regime by distributing estate property to 
creditors of lower priority than the Drivers, leaving the Drivers with no 
 
 80. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 175. 
 81. Id. at 176. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:21-2 (West 2011). 
 84. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 176. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. A settlement ensuring some minor distribution to unsecured creditors was seen as the 
best possible outcome given “‘the risk . . . of litigation, including the prospect of waiting for 
perhaps many years before a litigation against Sun and CIT could be resolved’ and the lack 
of estate funds sufficient to finance that litigation.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 177. 
 89. Id.  It is not clear from the record why the agreement left out the Drivers, but “[i]t 
seems that the Drivers and the other parties were unable to agree on a settlement . . . and Sun 
was unwilling to pay the Drivers as long as the WARN Act lawsuit continued because Sun 
was a defendant in those proceedings.” Id. 
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payment at all.90  The bankruptcy court rejected the priorities argument 
(and others relating to the structured dismissal),91 approving the dismissal 
of the Chapter 11 case along with the accompanying agreement.92  The 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.93  The Drivers 
appealed, with the U.S. Trustee participating as amicus curiae.94  On 
appeal, the Third Circuit addressed whether structured dismissals are at all 
permissible under the Code and then whether settlements in the context of 
structured dismissals may skip over objecting creditors in favor of a class of 
creditors junior to those objecting.95 
In answering the first question, the court noted that although the Code 
does not expressly authorize structured dismissals, it does explicitly 
authorize bankruptcy courts to change the effect of dismissal for cause—
essentially, “the Code does not strictly require dismissal of a Chapter 11 
case to be a hard reset.”96  The Drivers raised concerns that bankruptcy 
courts’ broadening settlement-approval power paves the way for 
illegitimate sub rosa plans to take hold,97 arguing that, had Congress 
intended to leave open a means by which debtors could sidestep Chapter 11 
plan confirmation and Chapter 7 conversion procedures, it would have 
explicitly included such a provision in the Code.98  In response to this, the 
Third Circuit noted the possibility that the Code may forbid structured 
dismissals where they are intended to circumvent the plan confirmation or 
Chapter 7 conversion processes.99  However, it found that in this case the 
Drivers had mounted no real challenge to the bankruptcy court’s finding 
that there was no prospect of achieving a confirmable plan and that Chapter 
7 conversion was futile.100  Thus, the court deemed the Drivers’ concern 
 
 90. Id. at 178.  WARN Act claims consistently have been held to be within “the nature 
of wages” under § 507(a)(4). Id. at 177 (quoting In re Powermate Holding Corp., 394 B.R. 
765, 773 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008)).  Therefore, the Drivers’ WARN Act claims were of higher 
priority than the tax and trade creditors’ claims. 
 91. See id. at 178 (“The Trustee also objected on the ground that the Code does not 
permit structured dismissals, while the Drivers further argued that the Committee breached 
its fiduciary duty to the estate by ‘agreeing to a settlement that, effectively, freezes out the 
[Drivers].’”). 
 92. See id. at 179. 
 93. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Bank. No. 08-
11006(BLS), 2014 WL 268613, at *3–4 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014) (finding that the bankruptcy 
court correctly applied the Martin factors in determining that the proposed settlement was 
“fair and equitable”).  The Martin test derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in TMT 
Trailer Ferry, see Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968), and contains four criteria to be considered in settlement 
approval:  “(1)  the probability of success in litigation; (2)  the likely difficulties in 
collection; (3)  the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and 
delay necessarily attending it; and (4)  the paramount interest of the creditors,” In re Martin, 
91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 94. See Jevic, 787 F.3d at 179. 
 95. See id. at 180–86. 
 96. Id. at 181; see also 11 U.S.C § 349(b) (2012). 
 97. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 181; see also infra Part III.B. 
 98. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 181. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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immaterial “absent a showing that [the] structured dismissal [was] contrived 
to evade the procedural protections and safeguards of the plan confirmation 
or conversion processes.”101 
In dealing with the second issue, whether structured dismissals can be 
approved notwithstanding deviation from the Code’s priorities, the court 
referred to two conflicting rulings by its sister circuits—a Fifth Circuit 
decision, Matter of AWECO,102 and a Second Circuit decision, Iridium.103  
In those rulings, structured dismissals were not contemplated; rather, the 
Fifth and Second Circuits considered whether bankruptcy courts can 
approve preplan settlements that undermine the Code’s contemplated order 
of priorities.104  Ultimately, the Jevic Court adopted, in the context of 
structured dismissals, the standard applied by the Second Circuit to preplan 
settlements in Iridium, namely that priority deviation is acceptable under 
rare circumstances.105 
B.  The Second Circuit’s Flexible Iridium Standard 
In Iridium, the debtor’s former parent company objected to a preplan 
settlement that would distribute estate property to lower priority creditors 
before the parent received any payment.106  Under the Rule 9019 factors of 
TMT Trailer Ferry,107 the Second Circuit found that “[t]he ‘fair and 
equitable’ analysis . . . does not assess whether a plan conforms to the 
absolute priority rule.”108  Although compliance with priorities 
must be the most important factor for the bankruptcy court to consider 
when determining whether a settlement is “fair and equitable” under Rule 
9019 . . . where the remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of approving 
the settlement, the bankruptcy court . . . could endorse a settlement that 
does not comply in some minor respects with the priority rule.109 
The court qualified this standard by mandating that a reviewing court 
adequately explain its reasons for approving a settlement containing 
deviations from the priority scheme.110  In adopting the Second Circuit’s 
approach, the Third Circuit in Jevic held that bankruptcy courts may, only 
upon “specific and credible grounds,”111 approve a structured dismissal that 
 
 101. Id. at 182. 
 102. United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 103. In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 104. See id. at 455; AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298. 
 105. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 180–84. 
 106. Iridium, 478 F.3d at 456 (“Motorola[,] . . . [a] priority-creditor, objects to the 
Settlement on the grounds that it takes a portion of estate property and distributes it to lower 
priority creditors . . . before any payments are made to Motorola.”). 
 107. See Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968). 
 108. Iridium, 478 F.3d at 463 n.18. 
 109. Id. at 464–65. 
 110. See id. at 465. 
 111. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Iridium, 478 
F.3d at 466). 
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impairs the rule of priorities.112  In so doing, the court rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s strict ruling against preplan settlement priority deviation.113 
C.  The Fifth Circuit’s Strict Matter of AWECO Standard 
In Matter of AWECO, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that the 
Code’s priority scheme is limited to agreements occurring within the 
confines of reorganization plans.114  In that case, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), a priority creditor, objected to the debtor’s settlement of an 
unsecured claim with a more junior creditor, arguing a violation of 
priorities.115  On appeal from the bankruptcy court’s approval of the 
settlement, the Fifth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court had abused its 
discretion because the facts were insufficient to show that the IRS had been 
treated fairly.116  In so finding, the court found that the “fair and equitable” 
standard of Rule 9019 and TMT Trailer Ferry means that “a bankruptcy 
court abuses its discretion in approving a settlement with a junior creditor 
unless the court concludes that priority of payment will be respected as to 
objecting senior creditors.”117 
D.  The Third Circuit Applies the Flexible Iridium Standard 
As noted, however, the Third Circuit refused to extend the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning to the structured dismissal in Jevic.  Instead, it held that the Jevic 
Court had acted within the realm of its authority in approving the structured 
dismissal agreement, notwithstanding the Drivers’ exclusion from the 
proposed distribution.118  The court pointed to the fact that a structured 
dismissal violating priorities was the “least bad alternative since there was 
‘no prospect’ of a plan being confirmed and conversion to Chapter 7 would 
have resulted in the secured creditors taking all that remained of the estate 
in ‘short order.’”119  According to the court, a structured dismissal was the 
only viable means by which creditors other than CIT and Sun could receive 
any payment in this case.120  Had the court faced a slightly different 
 
 112. The court recognized implicit support for the Drivers’ argument that structured 
dismissals cannot be approved where they distribute estate assets in violation of § 507 
priorities. Id. at 182; see, e.g., TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424 (“The 
requirement[] . . . that plans of reorganization be both ‘fair and equitable,’ appl[ies] to 
compromises just as to other aspects of reorganizations.”).  However, the court noted that the 
cases cited by the Drivers spoke in the context of plans of reorganization and not settlements 
and are therefore not dispositive. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 183. 
 113. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184. 
 114. United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
 115. Id. at 295. 
 116. Id. at 299. 
 117. Id. at 298. 
 118. See Jevic, 787 F.3d at 185. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id.  The facts of this case may therefore limit the Third Circuit’s holding—the 
Drivers were unable to agree on a settlement with the other parties, but the court determined 
that this obstacle alone did not provide an adequate reason to entirely upend the proposed 
settlement arrangement. 
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situation, perhaps one in which there existed some viable alternative to a 
structured dismissal, or one in which the settlement agreement could 
reasonably have been altered to conform with priorities,121 it may have 
decided differently.122 
As a counter to the flexibility of its ruling, the Jevic Court pointed out 
that “[a]lthough . . . the Code and the Rules do not extend the absolute 
priority rule to settlements in bankruptcy . . . the policy underlying that 
rule—ensuring the evenhanded and predictable treatment of creditors—
applies in the settlement context.”123  Thus, the court imposed a 
requirement that bankruptcy courts find “specific and credible” grounds 
upon which to justify deviation, which arguably gives body to the “fair and 
equitable” standard of Rule 9019 by warding off approval of structured 
dismissals devised by certain creditors only to improve their own estate 
shares at the expense of others.124 
III.  THE JEVIC HOLDING:  A PROPER OR IMPROPER EXTENSION? 
Part III considers whether the Third Circuit’s application of the Iridium 
standard to structured dismissals was proper.  It refers both to the practical 
and policy justifications provided by the Jevic Court and to the Code’s plan 
confirmation and preplan settlement requirements as important points of 
comparison.  Part III.A first commends the Third Circuit’s focus on the 
importance of compromise and the prevention of economically obscure 
outcomes.125  Then, Part III.B criticizes the lack of procedural safeguards 
present in the Third Circuit’s proffered standard, along with its reliance on 
Second and Fifth Circuit cases that arguably are not analogous with the 
structured dismissal at issue in Jevic.126 
A.  A Proper Extension:  Promoting Economic Efficiency 
and Encouraging Stakeholder Compromise 
In adopting the Second Circuit’s approach from Iridium, the Jevic Court 
touched on Congress’s intent when it enacted §§ 507 and 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
of the Code.127  It noted the absence of evidence that Congress considered 
settlements when legislating on this128 and pointed out that in fact 
bankruptcy courts’ authority to approve settlements between parties stems 
 
 121. The dissenting judge, while agreeing with the majority’s adoption of the Second 
Circuit’s rule from Iridium, did not believe Jevic presented the kind of extraordinary 
circumstance that justifies departure from § 507 priorities. See id. at 186 (Scirica, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“An alternative settlement might have been 
reached in Chapter 11, and might have included the WARN Plaintiffs.”). 
 122. The court pointed out that this case was a “rare instance[].” Id. at 180.  Further, it 
pointed out that “compliance with the Code priorities will usually be dispositive of whether a 
proposed settlement is fair and equitable.” Id. at 184. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See infra Part III.A. 
 126. See infra Part III.B. 
 127. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 128. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182 n.7. 
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from Rule 9019, which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, not from 
congressional action.129  Pursuant to that point, the court also noted that 
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever explicitly stated that the 
absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) should apply to settlements in 
bankruptcy.130  Thus, there is very little to indicate that the strict rules 
governing plan confirmation, particularly those governing nonconsensual 
plan confirmation, should apply to negotiated agreements of the kind at 
issue in Jevic, even where, like nonconsensual plans, there is an objecting 
class of creditors. 
In support of this point, the court laid out some factors that tend to 
indicate that Congress might have had different intentions with respect to 
negotiated agreements as compared with plan confirmation.131  Specifically, 
the court highlighted the importance of settlements in bankruptcy, noting 
that settlements are as favored in bankruptcy as in other areas of the law.132  
Compromises and settlements have long played a crucial role in the 
bankruptcy process, as they prevent stakeholders from having to endure the 
time and expense of ongoing proceedings.133  As a result, the court 
reasoned that the Code and the Rules ought naturally to leave bankruptcy 
courts additional flexibility in approving settlements as compared with 
confirming Chapter 11 plans of reorganization.134  Successfully negotiated 
agreements are bound to become more commonplace where the approval 
process is less stringent, which fosters the important policy of encouraging 
Chapter 11 stakeholders to strike compromises in an effort to rescue what 
remains of the debtor corporation and to ensure fair distribution of any 
remaining assets. 
Moreover, a flexible approach to structured dismissal approval prevents 
bankruptcy courts from being compelled to reach outcomes that fail to serve 
the majority interest and perhaps cut against economic incentives.  
Referring again to congressional intent, the Third Circuit noted that the 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 183 (noting that the Drivers themselves conceded that the absolute priority rule 
does not apply in this situation, but instead argued over the applicability of its underlying 
legal principle).  The Supreme Court has held that a settlement proposed as part of a 
reorganization plan must conform to the absolute priority rule to be considered “fair and 
equitable,” Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968), but “[w]hen a settlement is presented for court 
approval apart from a reorganization plan . . . the [absolute] priority rule . . . is not 
necessarily implicated,” In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 131. See Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184. 
 132. Id.; see also In re Nutraquest, 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 133. See Valencia, supra note 63, at 430 (“[N]egotiated outcomes save the bankruptcy 
estate the time and expense of protracted proceedings, perhaps even litigation, regarding the 
disputed issue or issues.  The courts are uniform in their respect, desire, and appreciation of 
settlements in a bankruptcy case.”); see also In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[I]t is an unusual case in which there is not some litigation that is settled between the 
representative of the estate and an adverse party.”); 6B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS 
EDITION, supra note 60, § 59:575 (“Compromises are favored in bankruptcy.”). 
 134. Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184 (“[I]t would make sense for the Bankruptcy Code and the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to leave bankruptcy courts more flexibility in 
approving settlements than in confirming plans of reorganization.”). 
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Code’s drafters could not have intended § 507 to force an “economically 
ugly result” where a more beneficial alternative clearly exists.135  In Jevic, 
for instance, the bankruptcy court made findings of fact that the dire 
circumstances of the case warranted the kind of relief requested by the 
debtor:  there was no real possibility of a meaningful distribution to anyone 
except Jevic’s secured creditors unless the structured dismissal was 
approved because the ordinary Chapter 11 exit strategies would not have 
proved practical.136  Furthermore, the Drivers’ WARN Act claim against 
Jevic was deemed “effectively worthless” because of the lack of 
unencumbered funds remaining in the Jevic estate; thus, the risk of 
prejudice to the Drivers as a result of their exclusion from the agreement 
was essentially nonexistent and did not provide the Third Circuit with 
sufficient reason to overturn a bankruptcy court ruling that clearly operated 
in the best interest of a majority of the debtor’s creditors.137 
The Third Circuit evidently saw reason to rely on the findings of fact of 
the bankruptcy court below and to trust in the bankruptcy judge’s 
conclusion as to which outcome would best serve the majority interest.  One 
might argue, then, that any tight restriction placed on bankruptcy judges’ 
ability to deviate from priorities in this context must be based on some 
unfounded distrust in bankruptcy judges to make these important judgment 
calls.138  Although an in-depth analysis of political distrust in bankruptcy 
courts is beyond the scope of this Note, whether bankruptcy judges are 
capable of determining in every instance which outcome best meets the 
interests of the estate and creditors is pertinent to whether they should have 
the authority to approve structured dismissals that undermine the Code’s 
contemplated priorities. 
Since bankruptcy courts are non-Article III tribunals, the breadth of 
bankruptcy judges’ power has long been questioned.139  In fact, numerous 
bankruptcy reform efforts arguably have sought to curb the discretion of 
bankruptcy judges,140 which seems to cut against the notion that Congress 
would have intended the kind of flexibility provided through the Jevic 
holding.  However, specifically in the context of settlement approval, 
bankruptcy judges historically enjoy significant discretion.  They are 
 
 135. Id. at 185–86. 
 136. Id. at 178. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 185–86 (“We doubt that our national bankruptcy policy is quite so 
nihilistic and distrustful of bankruptcy judges . . . .  [T]he Code permits a structured 
dismissal, even one that deviates from the § 507 priorities, when a bankruptcy judge makes 
sound findings of fact that . . . the settlement is the best feasible way of serving the interests 
of the estate and its creditors.”). 
 139. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, 
and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 747 (2010) (“Bankruptcy judges enjoy 
neither of the twin structural protections provided by Article III of the Constitution:  life 
tenure and compensation that cannot be diminished.”). 
 140. See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 139, at 776 n.158 (“Bankruptcy judges have been 
critical of the 2005 amendments [to the Bankruptcy Code] in part because of the view that 
one motivation for the [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act] was 
political distrust of the bankruptcy bench.”). 
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entrusted through Rule 9019 with determining whether a particular 
compromise serves the estate’s best interests.141  Moreover, reviewing 
courts grant great deference to these decisions, looking only for a “clear 
abuse of discretion” in determining whether to approve a bankruptcy court’s 
ruling on a particular settlement agreement.142  While this breadth of power 
has developed through common law, Congress has not legislated to rein that 
power in, which perhaps speaks to the existence of greater congressional 
trust in bankruptcy judges where these bankruptcy-specific questions are at 
play.143  Although “[t]here is no explicit command in the Code requiring 
such deference . . . it is taken to be implicit in the generalized, open-
textured instructions the Code gives to bankruptcy judges.”144  Such 
analysis might speak to the appropriateness of the kind of flexibility 
afforded to bankruptcy judges through the Jevic decision. 
Despite these considerations, the importance of cooperation among 
stakeholders and the need for economic efficiency may be outweighed by 
the need to instill the procedural protections of the Code and the Rules.145  
The next section discusses whether these vital safeguards, which exist in 
both the plan confirmation and the settlement approval context,146 
overshadow the Third Circuit’s Jevic reasoning and should prevent 
approval of structured dismissals that are noncompliant with § 507 
priorities.147  The section also discusses the Third Circuit’s potentially 
problematic assumption that an agreement in a structured dismissal is a 
settlement like any other and, in so doing, criticizes the court’s failure to 
highlight the differences between a preplan settlement and a structured 
dismissal when adopting the Iridium standard.148 
B.  An Improper Extension:  
The Need to Enforce Procedural Safeguards 
Even though structured dismissals contain negotiated agreements 
between parties, where a structured dismissal is disputed for violation of 
priorities, even if by a single class of creditors, it does not fall squarely 
within the bankruptcy meaning of the term “consensual.”  Where plan 
confirmation is concerned, a consensual plan requires every class to agree 
to the proposed plan by a supermajority, meaning it must be approved by 
 
 141. See supra Part I.D. 
 142. See, e.g., Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (limiting the review 
of the bankruptcy court’s settlement approval to determining whether there was a clear abuse 
of discretion). 
 143. See McKenzie, supra note 139, at 778. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 52 (“[W]e could often save the time and expense of 
litigating questions simply by ignoring substantive rights and picking a winner, but that is 
not the way we generally decide disputes.  Indeed the claims of the various parties may not 
have been worth litigating, but that is no reason to pick a winner without bothering to 
litigate.”). 
 146. See supra Part I.A–D. 
 147. See infra Part III.B. 
 148. See infra Part III.B. 
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more than one-half of the number of claims and two-thirds in value.149  
Where a compromise is concerned, there is no such clear-cut consensus 
requirement; however, where there exists an objection to the proposed 
agreement, the circumstances align more with nonconsensual plan 
confirmation than with consensual plan confirmation.  Because of this, 
comparison with the hurdles set up in § 1129(b) arguably sheds some light 
on whether the Third Circuit erred in adopting such a lenient standard for 
approval of priority-noncompliant structured dismissals. 
Because § 1129(b) contemplates plan approval over and above the 
objections of certain creditors, its requirements are rather stringent.  All of 
the provisions of § 1129(a), aside from § 1129(a)(8), which requires plan 
acceptance by all classes of impaired claims or interests, must first be 
satisfied.150  Moreover, the proposed plan must be “fair and equitable” with 
respect to each objecting impaired class of claims or interests.151  Further 
still, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which codifies the absolute priority rule, requires 
that in order for a plan to be fair and equitable, senior creditors must be paid 
in full before junior creditors receive or retain any property on account of 
their junior claim or interest.152  As noted, these requirements have never 
been explicitly declared applicable to settlements in bankruptcy.153  The fair 
and equitable standard of § 1129(b) is not the same fair and equitable 
standard interpreted under Rule 9019, and the absolute priority rule has 
only ever been used where plan confirmation is concerned.154  Despite this, 
where a structured dismissal is contemplated, a bankruptcy court may have 
good reason to pay close attention to these requirements. 
Notwithstanding the potential advantages of structured dismissals, their 
growing approval by bankruptcy courts has not been without controversy.  
Specifically, stakeholders not benefited by a structured dismissal often 
argue that bankruptcy courts do not have the authority, either express or 
inherent, to approve such agreements because they offer an exit strategy not 
specifically provided for in the Code.155  Whereas the plan confirmation 
process is safeguarded by stringent requirements for approval, the 
structured dismissal process provides stakeholders with no such statutory 
safeguards.156  Chapter 11 debtors requesting structured dismissals often 
seek to rely on §§ 1112(b) and 305(a)(1), both of which provide for 
dismissal of Chapter 11 cases for cause, along with § 105(a),157 which 
 
 149. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 153. See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2015); see also supra Part 
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 157. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), 305(a)(1), 105(a) (2012); see also Norman L. Pernick & 
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provides that bankruptcy courts may enter “any order, process, or judgment 
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the 
Code].”158  Parties also invoke § 349(b) of the Code, which describes the 
effect of dismissal but reserves a possibility that such effect may be altered 
for cause by a court order.159  However, even if bankruptcy courts’ 
authority to approve structured dismissals can be read into the Code’s 
provisions, the absence of a specific provision governing structured 
dismissals highlights their unconventional nature and raises a potential need 
for especially close monitoring and scrutiny. 
As abovementioned, structured dismissals have been compared with 
illegitimate sub rosa plans of reorganization.160  In In re Biolitec, Inc.,161 
for instance, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey 
rejected a proposed structured dismissal in part on the ground that it 
resembled a sub rosa plan.162  The court noted that the scope of bankruptcy 
courts’ ability to approve structured dismissals is limited, even where they 
do comply with the priorities of § 507, pointing out that courts have 
permitted structured dismissals only occasionally by adopting a broad 
interpretation of § 105(a).163 
Further, the Biolitec Court reasoned that the particular agreement in 
question could not be approved because it shifted stakeholders’ rights 
without satisfying many of the Code’s most important safeguards.164  It 
found that cases in which structured dismissals have been approved, such as 
In re Buffet Partners, L.P.,165 have been based in large part upon the fact 
that the agreement “satisfied the most important Code requirements, 
including disclosure, consent or voting of creditors, and compliance with 
statutory priorities and the absolute priority rule.”166  In Biolitec, however, 
those who were not a party to the agreement that accompanied the dismissal 
did not receive an opportunity to negotiate or vote on its provisions, even 
though it “clearly affect[ed] parties’ rights by assigning rights and interests, 
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 159. See, e.g., In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015). 
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 166. Biolitec, 528 B.R. at 269. 
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forcing creditors to receive distributions through the [l]iquidating [t]rust 
instead of the bankruptcy process, and subordinating the claims of the 
[n]on-[d]ebtor [a]ffiliates.”167  Thus, the bankruptcy court felt it could not 
approve the proposed structured dismissal without some assurance that the 
creditor protections of § 1129 were either present or waived by all of the 
parties.168  By contrast, the Third Circuit’s lack of consideration for the 
unique problems presented by structured dismissals, such as the potential 
for subversion of Chapter 11 safeguards, is evidenced by its heavy reliance 
on Iridium, which dealt not with a structured dismissal but with a preplan 
settlement that violated § 507 priorities.169  The Third Circuit’s failure to 
mention the distinction between a preplan settlement and an agreement 
accompanying case dismissal is particularly noteworthy. 
Ultimately, the fact that Chapter 11 debtors must break through such 
stringent procedural barriers to achieve plan confirmation, a reorganization 
technique clearly contemplated by Congress and, in fact, the primary 
method of reorganization in Chapter 11, suggests that approval of a 
structured dismissal, a potentially unauthorized and certainly unclear 
bankruptcy exit strategy, should contain similar hurdles to ensure that the 
principles and goals of Chapter 11 are upheld.  Allowing bankruptcy judges 
the flexibility to approve a structured dismissal that distorts the Code’s 
priority regime, with a requirement only that such deviation be justified 
upon “specific and credible” grounds,170 arguably undermines the otherwise 
transparent nature of Chapter 11 approval procedures.  According to the 
Third Circuit in Jevic, the specific and credible grounds requirement is 
intended to enforce the fair and equitable standard of Rule 9019 as well as 
the underlying policy of the absolute priority rule—ensuring the 
“evenhanded and predictable treatment of creditors.”171  However, the 
court’s lenient holding appears to fall short of that goal; the court 
essentially rules out structured dismissals only where the agreement was 
formed specifically to contravene Chapter 11 safeguards, expressing little 
concern about a situation in which a structured dismissal innocently 
mistreats an impaired class of claims or interests.172 
In sum, there is plainly an argument that even where a bankruptcy court 
or a reviewing court offers some “least bad alternative” justification for 
approval of a structured dismissal that does not comply with priorities,173 
that justification is counteracted by the need to protect creditors from abuse 
of the Chapter 11 process.  While economic efficiency is important, the 
answer may not be to subordinate a particular party’s claim or interest for 
the purpose of making matters easier or accelerating conclusion of the 
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 169. In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 170. Id. at 184. 
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 172. The Third Circuit’s ruling seems to understand the “evenhanded and predictable 
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 173. Id. at 185. 
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debtor’s case.  As an alternative to the structured dismissal in Jevic, for 
instance, “the case could have been settled with the proceeds held pending 
the outcome of the WARN Act litigation.”174  And, even if this alternative 
would not have been feasible, perhaps because of the negotiation deadlock 
caused by Sun being the subject of the Drivers’ WARN Act claims,175 the 
threat that the estate would be consumed by litigation may not be enough to 
end the case simply by excluding the WARN Act claimants from 
distribution altogether.176 
IV.  TREAD CAREFULLY:  
HITTING THE STEPS OF THE CHAPTER 11 PROCESS 
Part IV of this Note suggests that, because of the questions surrounding 
the legitimacy of the use of structured dismissals in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy,177 the Third Circuit’s adoption of the Second Circuit’s flexible 
approach to priority deviation was improper.  It notes that the benefits of 
the Third Circuit’s ruling, namely the promotion of compromise and the 
prevention of obscure or unwanted monetary outcomes, are outweighed by 
the need to protect creditors from the risk that their rights will be 
undermined.178  While this Note does not suggest that priority deviation 
should never be permitted through a structured dismissal, it puts forward a 
standard for reviewing priority-noncompliant structured dismissals that 
would better allow bankruptcy courts to determine, on a subjective, case-
by-case basis, whether the safeguards of plan confirmation would be 
subverted if the dismissal and its accompanying agreement were to be 
approved.179 
A.  A Slip and Fall:  The Third Circuit’s 
Lack of Respect for Procedural Safeguards 
A bulk of the reasoning behind the Third Circuit’s affirmation of the 
structured dismissal in Jevic is based upon the notion of economic 
efficiency.180  The court refers to the agreement between the parties as the 
“least bad alternative” given the circumstances of Jevic’s bankruptcy 
estate.181  However, not only did a potentially reasonable alternative to the 
structured dismissal exist,182 but even if there were no such alternative, that 
does not provide a sufficient basis upon which to subordinate an entire class 
of claims.  Although the court approved the structured dismissal with the 
caveat that approval will only be deemed appropriate in a “rare case,”183—a 
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holding that this Note does not criticize–the court then fails to provide any 
kind of breakdown as to the kinds of “rare cases” that might warrant a 
similar ruling in the future.  While this Note recognizes that the court could 
not have predicted with particularity the various factual scenarios that might 
give rise to an acceptable priority-noncompliant structured dismissal, its 
requirement that bankruptcy courts simply provide “specific and credible 
grounds” upon which to justify a priority deviation is a poor effort to police 
the use of structured dismissals going forward.184 
Further, another of the Third Circuit’s chief rationales for approving the 
structured dismissal in Jevic, namely the promotion of compromise among 
parties,185 is not well supported.  As noted, the court fails to point out, when 
applying the Iridium holding, that structured dismissals differ from other 
bankruptcy settlements in that they deal specifically with distributing the 
remainder of the estate’s assets upon the close of the case after the asset 
pool has already been substantially depleted.186  As a result of the court’s 
failure to pay regard to this distinction in its discussion of the need to 
promote compromise, it cites no authority that speaks specifically to the 
structured dismissal context.187  In fact, due to their fairly recent 
development and use, where structured dismissals are concerned there is no 
longstanding history of compromise among stakeholders as there may be at 
other points in the Chapter 11 process.188 
Moreover, not only does the Third Circuit inappropriately emphasize 
economic efficiency and compromise at the expense of the Drivers’ rights 
to see their WARN Act claims through, it then fails to put any emphasis 
where the emphasis in fact belongs—the preservation of Chapter 11 
procedural safeguards.  The majority fails entirely to address structured 
dismissals’ similarity to sub rosa plans of reorganization.  Judge Scirica’s 
partial dissent is the only opinion to deal with this concern.189  He notes that 
[a]lthough the . . . structured dismissal here does not, strictly speaking, 
constitute a sub rosa plan—the hallmark of such a plan is that it dictates 
the terms of a reorganization plan, and the settlement here does not do 
so—the broader concerns underlying the sub rosa doctrine are at play.190 
Judge Scirica goes on to note that the proposed structured dismissal sought 
to reallocate assets in a manner that would not have been possible were it 
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not for the authority conferred by Chapter 11 upon the creditors’ 
committee, yet the reallocation fails to implement the “safeguards of 
disclosure, voting, acceptance, and confirmation.”191 
B.  Striking the Balance:  A Multifactor Analysis 
for Approval of Priority-Noncompliant Structured Dismissals 
To ward off the possibility that these important Chapter 11 creditor 
protections will be undermined, this Note suggests an analysis that would 
require bankruptcy judges to assess a priority-noncompliant structured 
dismissal with § 1129(b) in mind, notwithstanding that its requirements are 
not strictly applicable.192  A bankruptcy court, in deciding whether a 
structured dismissal that violates § 507 is “fair and equitable” under Rule 
9019,193 should pay particular attention to:  whether and when stakeholders 
whose rights would be affected by the structured dismissal were informed 
of the negotiations leading up to the proposed agreement; whether such 
stakeholders received sufficient opportunity to participate in the 
negotiations; whether such stakeholders received adequate opportunity to 
be heard on their objections; the nature of the claims or interests that would 
be subordinated by the proposed agreement; the nature of the claims or 
interests that would be protected or advanced through such subordination; 
whether there exists a viable alternative to the proposed agreement; and the 
relative difference in payout that would result to each class of creditors 
through the alternative course of conduct. 
While this is not intended to be a closed list of factors, a bankruptcy 
court’s reference to these issues would provide greater transparency in the 
structured dismissal approval process.  This Note proposes that a 
bankruptcy court should consider each of these factors (and others it deems 
necessary) and conduct a balancing test to decide whether, given the 
particular circumstances of the case, a structured dismissal that deviates 
from the Code’s priority scheme is appropriate.  The way in which these 
factors intertwine surely would vary according to context.  For instance, 
where a proposed structured dismissal follows a 363 sale, viable 
alternatives to the agreement may be few and far between (because the 
debtor’s estate already has been depleted through a sale of all or 
substantially all of its assets); thus, that particular factor may weigh heavily 
into the court’s decision in a 363 sale context.  Where, however, there has 
been no 363 sale, or where a bankruptcy court is concerned that a particular 
class of creditors is seeking to improperly advance its own interests at the 
expense of other creditors, its analysis may place greater emphasis on the 
importance of mirroring § 1129(b)’s procedural safeguards. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because of the extreme controversy surrounding the use of structured 
dismissals in bankruptcy, the Third Circuit’s recent decision to extend 
bankruptcy judges such flexibility in approving these agreements creates a 
platform for debate.  The problem of priority deviation is of the utmost 
importance, as payment distribution in bankruptcy raises not only economic 
concerns but also moral concerns, particularly where bankruptcy courts are 
presented with a situation like that of the Drivers in Jevic.  Ultimately, it is 
an issue that is ripe for review by the U.S. Supreme Court; accordingly, a 
petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed with the Supreme Court and is 
currently pending response.194  This Note proposes that, moving forward, a 
multifactor analysis governing the use of structured dismissals that violate 
priorities would be most helpful in achieving equitable outcomes, while 
also preserving Chapter 11 procedural safeguards. 
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